Africa’s Evolving Engagement with the SCO and BRICS: Key Highlights from “Russia’s Pivot to Asia”

On September 17, Russia’s leading analytical media platform, Russia’s Pivot To Asia, published an excellent and timely analysis examining the connections between Africa, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and BRICS.

The article is highly informative, well-researched, logically structured, and well-argued. We think that its content provides valuable reference material for African leaders, policymakers, business communities, and the wider public. Therefore, we have decided to summarize the entire analysis and present its key insights and arguments in a concise format for our readers. The September 2026 SCO summit in Bishkek opened a new institutional channel between the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the African Union, with leaders of all 10 SCO member states approving 28 documents, including a decision to sign an MoU between the SCO Secretariat and AU Commission.

The arrangement connects the SCO’s 10 members with the African Union’s 55 countries, but it is not a free-trade agreement and does not currently include a disclosed tariff package, investment fund, quantified trade target or binding infrastructure programme. Its significance lies in connecting economic relationships that are already developing separately across Russia-Africa, China-Africa, India-Africa, Central Asia-Africa, BRICS-Africa and EAEU-Africa. The SCO itself has expanded from six founding members in 2001 to 10 members after the accession of India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. Its members represent more than 3.4 billion people, around 40% of the global population, while their combined GDP at purchasing-power parity is approximately $80 trillion, around 35% of the global economy. Intra-SCO trade is approaching $1 trillion, creating a substantial economic base for possible expansion toward African markets.

SCO-Africa cooperation has developed from an earlier security relationship. In 2018, the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and the African Union’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism signed a cooperation memorandum in Algiers. Egypt became the first African SCO dialogue partner after the 2022 Samarkand summit. Egypt had already strengthened its regional security role through the 14,300-square-metre CEN-SAD Counterterrorism Centre, activated in 2021 and involving security networks from 27 Sahel-Saharan states, with a commitment of 2,000 military scholarships. The new SCO-AU channel broadens this relationship from security cooperation toward trade, investment, transport, technology, energy and economic development.

Transport connectivity is central to this emerging economic relationship. Central Asia provides a natural interface between China, Russia, South Asia, the Caspian region and West Asia. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway can strengthen east-west connectivity while potentially opening routes farther south toward the Middle East and African markets. The SCO’s 2026–2030 ports-and-logistics action plan, together with work on transport connectivity, digital transit, data-processing and artificial-intelligence infrastructure, provides important foundations for wider commercial links. Russia is also examining an African logistics hub and cargo base on the eastern coast, with Kenya and Mozambique identified as possible locations. Such infrastructure could handle Eurasian cargo entering African markets while creating routes for African minerals and agricultural products moving north.

Egypt has particular importance because approximately 12% of global maritime trade normally passes through the Suez Canal. It connects the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Middle East and African hinterland and therefore provides a natural junction between Asian, Eurasian and African supply chains. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 2026 state visit, China and Egypt signed more than 20 cooperation agreements covering artificial intelligence, renewable energy and expansion of the Suez Canal Economic Zone. They also discussed local-currency trade, infrastructure and economic cooperation. In 2025, China Energy Engineering Corporation secured a reported $1 billion commitment for renewable-energy and desalination projects in Egypt and agreed to move its regional headquarters to Cairo. Electric-vehicle manufacturing and renewable-energy cooperation are also developing in the Suez Canal Economic Zone. Russia’s El-Dabaa nuclear power project adds another major Eurasian-linked investment, while nuclear energy and nuclear science cooperation have also been discussed with Ethiopia. The relationship is consequently expanding into nuclear technology, desalination, renewable energy, electric vehicles and industrial localisation.

India-Africa trade has reached around $36.7 billion, with growing cooperation in infrastructure, digital connectivity, energy, manufacturing and logistics. Russia-Africa trade reached a record $27.7 billion in 2025. Russian agricultural exports to Africa reached $2.9 billion during the first half of 2026, with wheat accounting for more than 90% of volumes and Egypt taking the largest share. Russia’s exports to Africa were approximately $10.7 billion against imports of about $2.2 billion. FESCO has expanded maritime container services from Russian ports to Durban in South Africa and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania through Indian hubs, with the Tanzania route taking around 45 days. Russian plastics and industrial spare parts are already moving through the route, while African tea, coffee and agricultural products are expected to move in the opposite direction. Russia is also examining African extensions of the International North-South Transport Corridor through potential rail projects in Burkina Faso, Ghana, South Africa and Libya. Around ?1.2 billion, equivalent to roughly $14 million, has been allocated for logistics subsidies supporting priority shipments to African and Latin American markets.

Minerals and industrialisation provide another major area of convergence. Russian domestic deficits in manganese, uranium, chromium, titanium and bauxite are cited at 97%, 82%, 60%, 59% and 50%, respectively, while African countries possess major reserves of these and other strategic resources. At the same time, African markets require machinery, fertilisers, energy, transport equipment, technology and industrial investment. This creates opportunities to move from raw-material trade toward local processing and manufacturing. Russia and Belarus have discussed automobiles, agricultural machinery and local production in Africa. The EAEU has established relations with the African Union and COMESA, while cooperation with the East African Community and Economic Community of Central African States has also been discussed. The “Eurasian technologies – a common future” approach focuses on technology transfer, local production, specialist training, scientific cooperation and ICT. Russian business participation is expected to cover agriculture, transport, industry, mineral processing, energy and digitalisation.

The Sahel provides significant resource opportunities alongside major security requirements. Russia’s 2026 engagement with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has focused on the Confederation of Sahel States and opportunities involving uranium, gold, lithium, manganese and phosphate. Niger ranks seventh globally in uranium reserves, while Mali and Burkina Faso are major African gold producers. Russia is increasingly interested in processing and industrial development rather than extraction alone. Regular foreign-ministry consultations and possible expansion of the 3+1 mechanism into economic and financial cooperation could support these activities. Security remains important because mining, transport and infrastructure projects require stable operating conditions. Togo provides another potential gateway through the deep-water port of Lomé, which has been identified as a possible entry point for Russian and Belarusian goods into West Africa. Togo has stressed production, technological investment, infrastructure, raw-material processing and value creation, while proposing a broader African business forum for 2027.

Digital cooperation is also expanding alongside physical infrastructure. An international IT forum in Khanty-Mansiysk in June 2026 brought together representatives from almost 50 countries, including BRICS and SCO participants. Angola showed interest in Yugra’s digital technologies for hard-to-recover oil, where relevant solutions had reduced field-development costs by 2.5 times. Zimbabwe examined an AI-supported forest-monitoring system designed to detect illegal logging, while AI-based medical diagnostics were also presented. Angola also highlighted the importance of linking technology transfer with university education and technical training. This creates possibilities for cooperation combining digital systems with skills, research institutions, training and local industrial applications.

Finance will be critical for turning transport and industrial plans into actual trade. Discussions at the SCO level have included an SCO Development Bank, national payment-system integration and clearing mechanisms. One estimate suggests that transferring 30–40% of mutual SCO trade to alternative settlement infrastructure could eventually represent $700–800 billion in transactions and reduce banking costs by billions of dollars, although this remains an expert estimate rather than an existing settlement volume. African economies face similar payment and financing challenges as the African Continental Free Trade Area develops. Agriculture offers an immediate field for cooperation, with Russia and other EAEU members able to supply grain, fertilisers, agricultural machinery and processing technology while African economies provide agricultural products and expanding consumer markets. Africa’s median age is around 19, with approximately one million young people entering the labour market each month, increasing the importance of local processing, manufacturing, storage, logistics and training. Tourism, education, cultural exchanges, air connectivity and visa facilitation could further expand people-to-people links.

The September 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi adds another layer to this Africa-Eurasia economic architecture. Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa are full BRICS members, while Nigeria and Uganda are BRICS partners. The New Delhi Declaration covered trade, finance, health, energy, AI, digitalisation, climate, agriculture, industrial cooperation, education and people-to-people relations. It advanced cooperation on local-currency settlements, cross-border payments, multilateral guarantees, AI governance, digital health, smart grids, energy storage, Industry 4.0, SMEs, tourism and digitalisation. It also supported stronger African representation in international institutions and noted China’s expansion of zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations. The New Development Bank has become another channel for African infrastructure financing. In June 2026, it approved a $1 billion programme for municipal infrastructure across South Africa’s eight metropolitan municipalities. Egypt joined the NDB in 2023 and Algeria in 2025, expanding the Bank’s African project base.

The emerging structure therefore brings together several complementary economic networks. BRICS provides an established platform for trade, finance, payments, industrialisation and African representation, while SCO-AU cooperation can connect Eurasian railways, ports, logistics systems, energy networks, technology and industrial capacity with African markets. Egypt can connect the Mediterranean and Red Sea through Suez; Kenya and Mozambique can support eastern maritime routes; Togo can provide a West African gateway; Ethiopia can develop nuclear science and energy cooperation; Angola and Zimbabwe offer digital and technology opportunities; and Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger provide mineral and processing opportunities. The immediate challenge is implementation through practical mechanisms covering logistics, customs digitalisation, payments, industrial parks, mineral processing, agriculture, energy, technology transfer and project financing. If these networks become connected, the SCO-AU relationship can develop beyond institutional dialogue into a broader Eurasian-African commercial corridor, with the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow in October 2026 providing another potential platform for expanding these economic links. This article is a summary of content from the ‘Russia’s Pivot To Asia’ media platform.

Stephen Rozario is a researcher and columnist. 

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