Arakan Army, Regional Instability, and Bangladesh's National Security: Navigating the Challenges

The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar's Rakhine State has drastically altered the political landscape of South-east Asia, with no immediate reversal expected.

The Arakan Army had been conquering territory since November 2023, when Operation 1027 targeted Myanmar's military dictatorship. Bangladesh shares a 271 km border with Myanmar, which is now controlled by the Arakan Army- a non-state actor, ultimately transforming into a concern forBangladesh in terms of security and border management. Besides, Bangladesh is already hosting 1.3 million Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, with a constant threat of new influx for the last 3 years due to repression by both the Junta and AA. The ongoing conflict between Myanmar’s Junta and the Arakan Army puts Bangladesh in a cautious observer positionto negotiate the crisis and explore strategic choices to protect its national security.

Changing Border Management

As the dominating force in western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has shifted power dynamics in the region. The Arakan Army currently controls 14 of Rakhine State's 17 townships after the military junta abandoned its Western Command. They became the de facto authority along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh.

Changing focus from state-to-state concerns to non-state actors poses new diplomatic obstacles. The Arakan Army ethno-nationalist worldview guides its approach to local government. Effective communication channels are crucial for border security, preventing cross-border illegal activity.

Apart from the border management, Bangladesh faces several risks due to changing situation in Rakhine. The operation1027 increased targeted killings, arbitrary incarceration, and forceful eviction by AA troops. The Rakhine perceive the Rohingyas as unsuitable for Rakhine. Hence, recurring influxes are taking place on the border for the last three years as Rohingya continue to flee battlefields and burnt villages.

Yaba Keeps Pouring in

Drug trafficking is a pressing security concern along the Bangladesh-Myanmar Border. Bangladesh Border Guard reports a significant rise in drug trafficking tied to Arakan Army action. They seized almost 2.8 million Yaba tabletsfrom July to September 2025. Approximately 80% of drugs entering Bangladesh arrive by sea. The AA reportedly increased narcotics trafficking to Western and Middle Eastern markets via Bangladesh and Malaysia. So much for youth and societal stability. According to an intelligence estimate, thesuppliers associated with the Arakan Army are collaborating with multinational syndicates and several carriers spanning 17 routes. Some syndicates are already listed, while others have lately engaged in criminal activities. The smuggling of narcotics and weaponry from Myanmar has emerged as a significant national issue.

Fishermen Being Detained

Bangladesh's fisheries and trade have become vulnerable due to the Arakan Army's control of the maritime boundary. Attempts to recover fish or trade goods are often met withabduction, physical assault, and sometimes result in loss of life. In mid-January 2025, the AA detained three freighters transporting goods from Yangon to Teknaf. The package had an estimated value of 40 crore Bangladeshi taka. The demand for commissions on sea-borne trade is an economic tactic to control cross-border trade. Piracy against innocent vessels threatens Bangladesh's coastal economy in the long term, beyond safety concerns. Almost 200 fishermen were kidnapped in the Naf River between March and August of 2025. In October, A  soldier of the BGB was severely injured due to a mine blast near the border and died later due to severe injuries.

Spillover of Infights and Risk of Transnational Terrorism

The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is involved in complex and sometimes in fights with other organizations. ARSA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) have attacked the Arakan Army on several occasions over control dispute. These organizations claimed that they were protecting their members from genocide or persecution. Founded as amilitant organisation, it aimed to resist the Arakan Army. It is said that the ARSA has presence through its command post and training centres in the Rohingya camps of Cox’s Bazar. Having armed ARSA rebels in refugee camps along the border increases insecurity and hampers humanitarian efforts. The ARSA uses camps for recruiting and operations, competing with the AA in Rakhine for control.

The ARSA aims to create an independent Rakhine State or seize control of the Rohingya majority, while Bangladesh desires a supervised return through international legal processes. ARSA's armed activities may hinder repatriation efforts by deteriorating the situation due to conflict with the Arakan Army. The armed conflict reinforces the conditions that cause people to migrate, putting further burden on Bangladesh.

Geopolitical Implications and Strain on Bilateral Relations

The presence of both state and non-state forces in Myanmar and their increased capabilities has political and geopolitical implications for Bangladesh also. Bangladesh’s national security concerns and interests have come to a dilemma as it has become ‘intertwined’ with both the Junta and the AA. For border security, the AA is now the prime stakeholder, while for bilateral relations Myanmar Junta government is essential. Besides, it has also increased Bangladesh’s necessity to increase its partnership with ASEAN and other Southeast Asian states.

Bangladesh's national security reaction should focus on improving border infrastructure and surveillance to deter ARSA weapons, drugs, and Arakan Army intrusions. Using an informal ‘back channel’ approach, Bangladesh must negotiate with armed organisations that control border regionsto avoid the issues that Bangladesh is facing. Law Enforcement and Security Services should be more vigilant and focused on preventing the ARSA from misusing the refugee camps. While repatriation in the near future remains bleak, Bangladesh should continue to work relentlessly to keep the security, repatriation, and refugee crisis agenda on the International Agenda and in its bilateral relations with major regional and global powers.

By: Jaidul Karim Iram

Jaidul Karim Iram, has completed his graduation and post-graduation from the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka. He has also worked as a Junior Executive/Young Professional in an NGO in the Research and Innovation department, participated in several MUN competitions in national levels.

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