Exploring the future direction of Myanmar Crisis in 2025

The world has perhaps seen the biggest diplomatic and negotiating failures in recent years, which resulted in wars, devastation, and murder in South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

Although Myanmar is experiencing civil conflict and unrest with no end in sight, it receives less attention in comparison to the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine. Unstable, uncertain, volatile, unpredictable are some words that we may use to describe Myanmar's situation now. 

After a disastrous 2024, it is hard to predict if Myanmar would be a failing, split, and disintegrating republic or a new federal democratic nation in 2025. The people of Myanmar undoubtedly want to see significant changes, an end to these killings, ceaseless wars, and the establishment of peace, regardless of what occurs.

NUG claims that the resistance groups now either completely or largely control 144 townships of the country's 330 townships. While, Junta has stable control of 107 townships and rests are conflicting.

In 2024, junta has lost 741 junta outposts and 140 battalions including two regional commands (out of 14)North-eastern Command in northern Shan State and Western Command in Rakhine. During this period, some 315 military officers were killed along with 14,093 soldiers and border guard police.

The militarys Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs), once feared and admired are now facing humiliating defeats in the last two years in Shan, Chin, Kachin, Kayah and Rakhine states. Almost 88% of Rakhine, 85% of Chin and 90% of Northern Shan are now under resistance controlled. Desertions, low morale and loss of dignity have worsened the situation for junta.

However, despite these worsen scenario, Junta holds control of the major cities of Yangon, Mandalay, and the capital, Naypyidaw i.e., the majority of central Myanmar (Bamar region).

The resistance group's notable progress has been halted by China's presence. Chinese mediation is involved in a number of current peace talks and negotiations. Following its successful takeover of the majority of Rakhine State's townships, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) made a dramatic change on December 29 when it said, under pressure from China, that it was willing to engage in political discussion to settle internal disputes in Myanmar. Also, the influential Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) started peace talks with the junta on November 25; the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a major ethnic armed group, announced a truce with the Junta on December 4; and KIA joined the peace talks with the Myanmar Junta mediated by China.

In contrast to China's strong engagement with the junta and numerous important resistance groups, the United States and the West's assistance for the resistance groups battling for democracy appears to have little impact. Therefore, the crucial question for what we will most likely witness in 2025 is how far China would go to maintain the junta. As of right now, the junta's cataclysmic collapse is unlikely to occur. Instead, the junta and the ethnic armed groups might reach some negotiated agreements or truce.

In 2025, the junta has promised to hold a partial poll in regions under its authority. Resistance organizations and outside parties like the US, ASEAN, and the West have rejected the election, arguing that it won't be free, fair, or inclusive and will just be used to prolong military rule, similar to the 2010 vote.

China, meanwhile, has backed the junta's election campaign. Min Aung Hlaing, the military leader of Myanmar, traveled to China in November 2024 to meet with Premier Li Qiang. Li vowed to back the junta's decision to hold elections after the meeting. 

Junta may hold elections in regions under their stable control with Chinese support, but the majority of the opposition has already criticized the election, making it unlikely to put an end to hostilities and bring about peace.

Thailand, Bangladesh, India, and other countries are growing uneasy over Myanmar's worsening circumstances. Border security, rising drug manufacturing, international cybercrimes, refugee flows, and expanding exile populations are all major concerns. Bangladesh is still worried about the potential repatriation of the more than a million FDMN Rohingya that it has harbored.

China, the most influential external actor in Myanmar, has officially backed the junta and is keeping its options open as the situation remains volatile and unpredictable. The US and the West's support to resistance groups seeking democracy will likely to increase but how long China will go to keep junta afloat will remain the key issue.

Due to ASEAN's divided stance on Myanmar and non-interference principle, not much we should expect from ASEAN. On the other hand, US rivalry with China and Russia makes it difficult for any UN Security Council actions.

With these complex geopolitical issues, in 2025, though it's unlikely that the junta will fall but aspirations for peace, democracy, human rights and civilian rule must shape Myanmars future.

Sent- In by Dr. Mohammad Asaduzzaman, Professor, Department of Linguistics,  University of Dhaka

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