During the first meeting of the 20th session of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Bangladesh, along with Germany, Brazil, and Croatia, was elected the Vice-Chair of the platform.
Through its election as one of the Vice-Chairs of the relatively underexposed advisory body of the United Nations (UN), Bangladesh’s decades-long contributions to UN peace support operations and post-conflict recovery efforts have been recognized. As Bangladesh is confronted with protracted conflicts beyond its borderlands in the east and southeast, it has a novel opportunity as the Vice-Chair of the PBC to translate its leadership role and experience into actionable strategies that can reshape the peacebuilding process in its periphery.
UN Peacebuilding Commission and Bangladesh
The UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005, with its principal task being the supervision and implementation of post-conflict actions in states recovering from armed conflicts. The PBC is composed of 31 member-states, with the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) each selecting seven member-states, and the remaining ten members being selected on the basis of contributions to UN peace operations and to UN budget. At present, Bangladesh is a member of the PBC owing to its contributions to UN missions, and it has served as a member of the Commission since 2005. Also, it has previously served as the Chair of the PBC in 2012 and 2022, and as its Vice-Chair in 2013 and 2023.
Since its inception, the PBC has played an instrumental role in peacebuilding processes in several states. For instance, it has provided considerable support to the consolidation of peace in Liberia after two destructive civil wars, assisted in the democratic transition in the Gambia after prolonged authoritarian rule, helped facilitate decentralization and the holding of national elections in the war-torn Central African Republic (CAR), and is backing the peacebuilding process in Colombia after the de-intensification of civil conflict in the country. In a world increasingly beset with armed conflicts, the PBC has the potential to play a highly constructive role in establishing sustainable peace in post-conflict states.
As a member-state of the PBC, Bangladesh has served in leadership positions in the Commission several times, and is poised to play a similar role once again. Bangladesh has long been a leading contributor of personnel to UN peace missions, and currently, with 4,327 troops, police personnel, and civilian staff deployed in nine peace operations, it is currently the 3rd largest contributor to UN missions. In particular, thousands of Bangladeshi peacekeepers are currently deployed in high-intensity and risky conflict zones, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the CAR, South Sudan, and Lebanon, and at least 174 Bangladeshi peacekeepers have lost their lives while fulfilling their internationalist duties. Also, Bangladeshi peacekeepers have been heavily involved in peacebuilding processes in several post-conflict states, including Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Timor-Leste. Moreover, despite its modest economic capabilities, Bangladesh is a contributor to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), providing it with $50,000 in 2022, for example.
Leveraging Leadership Role for Peacebuilding near Home
While Bangladesh has contributed to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding efforts far from its frontiers, its own immediate neighbourhood, particularly Myanmar, has been in flames for a long time, and specifically since the outbreak of the civil war in 2021. In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, decades-long insurgencies and inter-ethnic conflicts culminated in the brutal ethnic cleansing of the Rohingyas in 2017–2018 from northern Rakhine State, and the outbreak of the current phase of the Rakhine War in 2023. As a result of these conflicts, Bangladesh is currently hosting more than 1.5 million Rohingya refugees, and it has generated numerous political, social, economic, security, and environmental challenges for a country already beset with socio-cultural malaise, political instability, and economic dislocations.
The PBC has a defined set of country-specific configurations, but the conflict-torn Myanmar is not a formal agenda country of the Commission. In September 2025, while addressing a ministerial-level meeting of the PBC in New York, the then Bangladeshi Adviser for Foreign Affairs Touhid Hossain highlighted the country’s persistent calls for a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis, and reiterated that the resolution of the protracted displacement of the Rohingyas is essential for regional peace and stability. As an advisory body, the PBC does not have the legal authority and practical capability to compel the belligerents in Myanmar to adopt a certain course of action, deploy any kind of missions, or directly negotiate the repatriation of the refugees. But after Dhaka’s assumption of Vice-Chairmanship of the PBC, Bangladesh has the opportunity to do more to address and redress the Rohingya crisis using the framework of the PBC.
First, framing the Rohingya crisis as a regional peacebuilding and prevention issue instead of just a humanitarian one, Bangladesh can request an informal meeting at the PBC on Myanmar and the Rakhine State under the Commission’s flexible thematic mandate. Once the PBC formally discusses the issue, it would generate political documentation, Chair’s summaries, and advisory notes to the UNSC and the UNGA, raising sustained institutional visibility. Afterwards, Bangladesh can push for designating Myanmar as a formal agenda country of the PBC.
Second, Bangladesh can advocate that the PBC develop an advisory framework for the Rakhine State, outlining citizenship and legal status guarantees for the Rohingyas, comprehensive security sector reform in the volatile territory, inter-ethnic reconciliation mechanisms, and sustainable economic development. This would not enforce compliance from either Myanmar or the Arakan Army, but it would create an internationally endorsed benchmark document, provide a reference point for donors and other involved actors, and shift discourse from “repatriation” to “sustainable reintegration.”
Third, as the PBC works closely with the PBF, Bangladesh can advocate sustained PBF support for initiatives to maintain social cohesion between the Rohingyas and host communities in Cox’s Bazar, implement programs for the de-radicalization of the youth, and stabilize livelihoods for the refugees and host communities. Also, if conditions in the Rakhine State improve, Dhaka should encourage contingency allocations for the region. This would ensure stability inside Bangladesh while preparing the groundwork for future return of the Rohingyas.
Finally, as one of the top contributors to UN peace operations, Bangladesh has garnered substantial credibility as a peacekeeping and peacebuilding actor. Hence, as the Vice-Chair of the PBC, it can promote discussions on a future UN civilian protection or monitoring mechanism in the Rakhine State, push for early planning on security guarantees required for voluntary repatriation of the refugees, and utilize its experience in UN operations to create practical models for peacebuilding in the region. This would allow Bangladesh to have a greater role in peacebuilding in the Rakhine State within the framework of international security mechanisms while shielding it from diplomatic controversies vis-à-vis Myanmar.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s steady membership and frequent assumptions of leadership roles in the PBC illustrates its credibility as an international peacekeeping and peacebuilding actor. As Bangladesh is confronted with a protracted refugee crisis at home and prolonged conflict in its immediate neighbourhood, it should leverage its position as the Vice-Chair of the PBC to highlight the Rohingya crisis, create a framework for peacebuilding in the Rakhine State, mobilize PBF funds for the victims, and laying the groundwork for safe, dignified, and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to their homeland.
Written by: Md. Himel Rahman
Author's Bio: Md. Himel Rahman is currently serving as Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University. His articles have been published on several platforms, including The Diplomat, The Interpreter, Asia Times, South Asian Voices, The Nation, The Daily Star, Dhaka Tribune, and New Age.
Copyright: Fresh Angle International (www.freshangleng.com)
ISSN 2354 - 4104
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